Abstract
Final evaluation of the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) program in Serbia-Montenegro (1997-2002), covering activities in regard to local media, NGO groups, community development projects (CDPs), conflict mitigation, and elections. Also covered are "handover strategies", project relations with the USAID Mission and other donors and partners, and OTI management. Major lessons learned are as follows: (1) In communities that express deep distrust of government born out of years of neglect, CDPs that contain tangible benefits for the citizenry are likely to have the greatest impact. This was precisely the case in South Serbia. Albanian citizens felt that traditionally the Serbian government did not care about them and did nothing to help them. They welcomed the OTI community improvement program (CIP) project because, for the first time, they were listened to and, most importantly, they could experience a tangible benefit (e.g., paved roads, renovated schools) resulting from government action. (2) Successful collaboration by former disputants on an actual CIP will not only help rebuild the community, but will also have the equally important benefit of promoting conflict mitigation. With OTI encouragement and support, in South Serbia former Albanian and Serbian antagonists for the first time worked together to bring donor funding into their communities to effect infrastructure improvements. This multi-ethnic collaboration reportedly eased tensions by demonstrating that cooperation was possible and yielded material community payback. (3) For OTI to be successful in a threatening and unstable political environment, it needs local project implementers (e.g., project development officers [PDOs] in Serbia/Montenegro) who are thoroughly in touch with the local political scene, are calm in view of the risks involved, are able to work under uncertainty, and are discreet. They are the front line implementers, the 'OTI gatekeepers' that select the local partners (e.g., NGOs), support them with money and TA, and monitor their performance. Their behavior determines what the program actually does and how well it performs. (4) If OTI is going to rely on NGOs as a key part of its implementation strategy, it needs to recruit NGOs that are fully qualified and fittingly experienced. OTI relied heavily on NGOs during its Serbia/Montenegro tenure. The NGOs were very effective in the 1997-2001 periods in doing tasks for which they were qualified and experienced. The Pace of Reform (POR) campaign (2001-2002) funded some NGOs that were unqualified and inexperienced in conducting the type of media campaign required. Time had to be spent in training them and then in relying on more on-the-job training. This was inefficient and unproductive in this type of media campaign, with its tight deadlines and monthly, rotating theme strategy. (5) The OTI Success Model can and should have application in other man- made disaster situations, particularly where uncooperative or hostile governments are involved. While application of the model would necessarily have to be adapted to a particular situation, it provides useful guidelines and a checklist.